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Abstract
Resource owners. wishing to maximize the present value of their
resource. will be influenced by a wide variety of economic factors. The
economic analysis presented suggests that the following factors tend to
increase the life of resources:
• a fall in the interest rate
• an expected rise in future prices
• an expected fall in future costs
• removal of import quotas
• prorationi ilg
• monopolization
• removal of severance taxes and royalty payments
• imposition of property taxes
• severance subsidies and percentage depletion allowances
• unitization of reservoirs
• rising costs of exploration
• abol ition of "ru les of capture. II
A present-value maximization model is also presented which indicates the
impact of interest rates on life of resource. rates of recovery. and optimal
ratio of reserves to output.
Introduction
The projected period of exploitation of oil, gas, and geothermal resources
depends on geological and geophystcal estimates of reservoir characteristics
and capacity. It also depends on engineering management concepts which affect,
among other things, recoverability and cost functions. Economic considerations
enter the picture when, given an estimate of recoverable resource quantity (and
quality) and the engineer's most efficient technology, the firm must make
decisions concerning the lifetime of the resource and the annual rate of
production.
Even renewable resources, such as timber and fish, are exhaustible and
nonrenewable resources themselves can have infinite lives if production rates
are reduced sufficiently: IImonopo1istic exploitation of an exhaustible asset
is likely to be protracted immensely longer than competition would bring about
or a maximizing of social value would require ll (Hote11ing, 1931, p. 152).
If it is economically feasible to exploit a resource, the period of
exploitation will be affected by a number of economic factors. In the
discussion below, the role of the following variables in the lifetime of oil,
gas, and geothermal resources will be presented:
• the rate of interest or discount rate
• future prices and costs
• monopolization, import quotas, and prorationing
• rules of capture and unitization




1. The Rate of Discount (or Interest)
The market rate of interest is the price (per $ hundred) at which business
firms can borrow or lend. In a perfectly competitive capital market under
conditions of certainty these two rates are the same, but otherwise the
borrowing rate is greater than the lending rate. For example, it is not
atypical for a firm to have to pay 12-15 percent interest on borrowed funds
and to obtain only 7-8 percent on funds lent without risk, Part of this
difference can be attributed to risk and much of the rest represents the
profit markup of professional lenders.
The rate of discount for a strongly-financed firm in a riskless invest-
ment will be close to the market rate of interest for lending, e.g., 7-8 percent.
Such a firm does not necessarily need to borrow outside funds for its capital
investments. The rate of discount for firms lacking internal funds will be
closer to the borrowing rate of interest for moderately risky investments.
For both types of firms the rate of discount will increase with increasing
riskiness. If the degree of risk is held constant, the rate of discount will
decrease when market interest rates fall, and vice versa.
The general effects of a lowering of interest (discount) rates are
• a lengthened period of exploitation (Herfindah1. 1967, pp. 67-8)
• a lower annual rate of production (Scott, 1967, p. 31)
• a shift toward more production in the future (McDonald, 1967, p. 282)
• a greater ultimate recovery (McDonald, 1967, p. 282).
Strongly-financed firms have a lower rate of discount than firms which
must rely on borrowed funds and will plan on longer operating lives for their
resources (Gaffney, 1967, p. 352). The steam-suppliers at The Geysers field
in California would no doubt prefer higher production rates and a faster
payout period than is the case with Pacific Gas and Electric: "It costs
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about $14 million to erect a 110,000~kw generating plant, and conservative
utility managements do not commit funds of that size unless assured of
sufficient steam to run the plan for at least 30 years" (Loehwing, 1973, p. 21).
As indicated by one analyst of energy economics, lithe strong firms arrive at
higher R:O [reserves to annual output ratios]. It is an industry truism that
weaker firms are more concerned with rate of recovery, and stronger firms with
holding reserves" (Gaffney, 1967, p. 352).
The Gaffney Model
The impact of the rate of discount can be illustrated by the Gaffney model
of optimal exploitation of natural resources (Gaffney, 1967, pp. 348-52).
Given an estimate of the physical quantity (Q) of a resource in a particular
location and a desire for steady annual production, the producer will determine
the economic life (L) of his deposit by maximizing (over all possible lifetimes)
the present net value of the resource.
Annual production will be a constant (Q/L) and the present value of
revenues (PVR) is given by
(1) PV R - Q (_1_ + 1 +... + 1 )
- L l+r (1+r)2 (l+r)L
= Q. 1- (1+r) -L
L r
where r is the rate of discount.
A general (although simplified) cost function can be obtained by assuming
that doubling of life cuts costs in half because only half as much capacity is
required. If the present value of the cost of extracting the entire resource
in one year (L=l) is denoted by K, the present value of costs is
(2) PV C = KI L.
Maximization of present net value (PNV = PVR - PVC) requires the maximi-
zation of the following expression:
(3) PNV - Q l-(l+r)-L K
- L r - [
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Given the cost (K) of exhausting the resource in one year and the rate of
discount (r), various values for lifetime of resource (from L=l to L=lOO, for
example) are inserted in equation (3). That value for L is chosen which
maximizes present net value.
If it is expected that 1,000,000 units of a resource can be extracted at
a constant (normalized) price of $1.00 per unit, and if K takes on a value of
$800,000, then the optimal lifetime of the resource is 7 years when the rate
of discount is 5 percent. Present net value is $712,601 with annual production
of 142,857 units. The half-life of the resource is 3.5 years and the optimal
reserve-output ratio is therefore 3.5 (Gaffney, 1967, pp. 351-2).
On the other hand, if the rate of discount rises to 25 percent, the
optimal lifetime falls to 4 years and the present value of the resource drops
to $390,400. Annual production increases to 250,000 units and the optimal
reserve-output ratio becomes 2:1.
In summary, higher rates of discount result in increased annual production,
shortened periods of exploitation, and lower reserve-to-output ratios. A
corollary of these results is that a government loan-subsidy program to
weakly-financed firms would have beneficial effects on the lifetime of their
resources.
2. Future Prices and Costs
Ordinarily an optimizing business firm will push production to the point
where marginal profits become zero (Cummings and Burt, 1969, p. 985). In
resource economics, however, the fundamental optimization principle is that
production is pushed to the point where marginal profit in one time period is
equal to the discounted marginal profit of the next time period. A necessary
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condition for maximization of the present net value of a resource with a given
1i fetime is
(4a)
where r is the rate of discount, R is marginal revenue, C is marginal cost,
and 0 ~ t ~ L = given lifetime of the resource (McDonald, 1967, p. 279).
If the marginal net discounted return is not the same in every year of
the resource's life, then profits could be increased by shifting production
from one year to another (Herfindahl, 1955, p. 131). The present value maxi-
mization condition can also be expressed as
(4b) R - C = (l+r)t (R - C )t too'
Equation (4b) indicates that, in the optimum time distribution of
production, marginal net income must increase at a percentage rate equal to
the rate of discount. This requirement means either
(1) expected prices must increase over time, or
(2) current production must be pushed closer to capacity so that current
marginal costs of production exceed future marginal costs of production.
Marginal costs can be expected to rise rapidly as production is pressed closer
to capacity (McDonald, 1967, p. 276).
If a technological advance is expected t years hence, marginal costs will
drop in year t and thereafter and equation (4b) will be satisfied only if
production in these later years is increased, The resulting increase in
production will cause marginal costs to rise until the point is reached where
marginal net discounted values are again the same in all time periods.
It is possible that exploration using present technology is more costly
than future exploration using superior techniques (Gaffney, 1967, p. 231).
Nevertheless, there are some indications that real exploration costs (in
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constant dollars) are rising in the petroleum industry. Although the percentage
of new field wildcats that find oil and gas has remained relatively constant
(at 11 percent), wells have been increasing in depth with costs per foot an
increasing function of depth itself, and there has been a slight decline in
average size of fields (Campbell, 1964, p. 117).
Rising real costs of exploration will tend to shift long-run marginal
cost curves upward with a resulting increase in price and decrease in annual
demand. The life of a given resource property will be lengthened, but the
total stock of properties will decrease (Herfindahl, 1955, p. 134). For
these conclusions to be valid, however, it must be assumed
that superior technology will not become available in the
future.
If it is suddenly expected that future prices will decline, it will pay
the firm to shift production toward the present. If future prices are
expected to rise, contrarily, production should be shifted toward the future.
The role of future prices can be exemplified in the context of the
Gaffney model (with Q=lOO, K=150, r=.20). If price in every time period is
expected to be $1.00 per unit, present value is maximized with a lifetime of
6 years and annual production of 16.67 units. If prices are expected to rise
10 percent a year, optimal lif.etime ;s 8 years with annual production of 12.5 units.
If prices areexpeated to rise 20 percent a year, it pays more in the lonq-run to
hold the resource as a reserve than it does to currently produce any amount at all.
That nonproduction might be more profitable than production is likely a
surprising result. However, if geothermal steam, for example, is worth $1 a
unit and it costs another dollar to raise it, the wellhead price is $2 a unit.
If the price at the wellhead is increasing 10 percent a year and there is no
change in the cost of raising it, then the value of the steam in the reservoir
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will be increasing 20 percent a year and this would be sufficient incentive
for the geothermal owner-operator to withhold his resource from current
production (Vickrey, 1967, p. 317).
3. Import Quotas, Prorationing, and Nonopolization
Until recently the United States crude oil industry operated under state
production restrictions which have been termed the allowable or prorate system
(Gaffney, 1967, p. 371; Davidson, 1963, p. 85). The system which has been
used by Texas is a fairly typical prorationing scheme. An estimate is made
of the market demand for crude oil at the current price. From this amount are
subtracted expected imports and production from old marginal wells ("stripper
wells") which require considerable mechanical pumping in order to bring the
oil to the surface. What is left over is allocated to the lower-cost wells
which operated during much of the 1960's at production levels which were far
below capacity. The number of day's production allowed for controlled wells
If in Texas fell from 345 to 97 days over the period 1947 to 1962 (Kahn, 1964,
p. 300). Prorationing was defended by its advocates as an instrument of
conservation of resources: "Its stated purpose is to avoid waste, which is
defined as production in excess of market demand (at the going market price)"
(Davidson, 1963, p. 96).
In reality, prorationing was more related to price-rigging and carteliza-
tion than to conservation. A bed-fellow of conservation, strangely enough, is
monopoly. The immediate result of prorationing was an excessive drilling of
development well s-- at a cost of $500 mi 11 ion a year--at a time when exi sting
wells were operating at a fraction of capacity "For the individual producer
sitting atop a known reservoir, the drilling of another development well
promises an almost certain (only one in four to one in five development wells
proves to be dry) additional ticket of admission to the cartel; it guarantees
...
- 8 -
an additional quota, at the rigged price, hence the possibility of a faster
pay-out" (Kahn, 1964, pp. 307,310).
Import quotas tend to hasten the exhaustion of the domestic crude oil
stock (Hause, 1963, p. 408). In 1962, for example, the United States denied
itself foreign oil which was $1.25 a barrel cheaper, in favor of 2.5 billion
barrels of domestic crude. This, despite the facts that Middle East proved
reserves were six times larger than ours and that their annual production was
1 percent of reserves whereas our annual production was 8 percent of reserves
(Kahn, 1964, p. 310). Another result of the import quotas has been higher
prices for both oil and oil-related products. It is possible, however, that
the higher prices have encouraged exploration of oil lands which otherwise
would have been submarginal (Davidson, 1964, pp. 130-1).
The issues of prorationing, import quotas, and monopolization are closely
interrelated. State governments have in the past encouraged ororationing and
the federal government has imposed import quotas, and both have resulted in a
cartelization which could be broken if there were free import of foreign
minerals: "If the suggestion seems too large-minded for American politics,
recall that mercantilism, surely a small-minded philosophY,traditionally
welcomes the import of crude raw materials. It is their export which stamps
one a colonial II (Gaffney, 1967, p. 407).
4. Rule of Capture and Unitization
The "rule of capture, II according to common law, enables the owner of a
reservoir to drill and recover the fluids or steam contained therein even
though they came from a neighbor's reservoir (Davidson, 1963, p. 94). This
kind of situation provides a classic example in economics of what is called an
externality where marginal private costs are less than marginal social costs.
The rule of capture encourages excessive production from such common-pool
..
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reservoirs and depletion is accelerated. The source of the problem is the
imperfect ownership which also causes a wasteful duplication of efforts in the
attempts of the various owners to reduce the resource to possession (Vickrey,
1967, p. 317).
The rule of capture discourages exploration for oil, gas, and geothermal re-
sources because the prospector confers potential benefits to neighboring land-
owners for which he cannot charge a fee. The market place offers the prospector
inadequate inducement to undertake socially desirable exploration (McDonald,
1967, p. 274) and a government subsidy program to wildcatters is one possible
remedy for this market imperfection (Vickrey, 1967, p. 327). Another (partial)
remedy is a joint venture arrangement whereby both expenses and benefits are
shared. A more general remedy is unitization or collective operation of a
reservoi r.
Compulsory unitization eliminates lithe insanity of competitive exploitation
of the individual reservoir ll (Kahn, 1964, p. 303). The principle of unitization
is recognized by both federal and state laws. Section 18 of the Federal
Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-581), for example, provides for
both voluntary and compulsory unitization:
IIFor the purpose of properly conserving the natural resources of any geo-
thermal pool, field, or like area, or any part thereof, lessees thereof and
their representatives may unite with each other, or jointly or separately with
others, in collectively adopting and operating under a cooperative or unit
plan of development ...
II[The Secretary of the Interior] may include in geothermal leases a
provision requiring the lessee to operate under such a reasonable cooperative
or unit plan, and he may prescribe such a plan under which such lessep shall
operate, which shall adequately protect the rights of all parties in
i nteres t ... II
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5. Severance Taxes and Royalty Payments
The economic effect of severance taxes varies according~to the method used
to determine the tax base. There are three general types of severance taxes:
(1) Ad valorem in situ taxes have a tax base which is the value of the
resource in the ground and are essentially a form of property tax.
(2) Ad valorem ex situ taxes have a tax base which is the value of the
resource currently produced. This type of tax is also known as a sales, ad
valorem severance, commodity excise, or royalty tax.
(3) Specific severance ex situ taxes have a tax base which is the
physical quantity produced. Such production taxes are calculated as so many
dollars per ton, gallon, or other physical unit.
A tax is considered neutraZ if it does not affect relative prices or
production. Although the ad valorem in situ tax (if taxed at the same
effective rate on all competing resources) is the only type of severance tax
which is in this sense neutral, it is a tax that is rarely levied because of
the extreme difficulty and controversy which accompanies attempts to determine
the tax base. The other kinds of severance taxes are "a discriminatory burden
on the exploitation of natural resources" (Vickrey, 1967, p. 322).
Ex situ severance taxes have the following effects:
• Prices are increased
• Production decreases
• Profitability declines
• Short-run conservation is aided by the decline in current production
but an offsetting consideration is the premature abandonment of marginal
operations




The extent to which prices will rise and production reduced depends on
the elasticities of the supply and demand curves of the firm. Figure 1,
"Pre-Tax Situation, Demand and Supp1y," shows a firm with a rising marginal
cost (Me) curve and a downward-sloping demand (D) or average revenue curve
and marginal revenue (MR) curve.
In the pre-tax situation, the profit-maximizing firm produces 160 units
at $2400 per unit so that total revenue is $384,000. Total variable costs
are $64,000 and, assuming $200,000 in fixed costs and $1,000,000 invested,
profits are $120,000 and the rate of return on capital is 12 percent,
If a 10 percent severance tax based on value of production is imposed,
profits will be maximized if production is reduced to 156.5 units--a decline
of 2.19 percent--with a new price per unit of $2435, an increase of 1.46
percent. Total operating costs will be $99,357 (of which $38,110 is the tax
cost) and profits will decline to $81,739. The rate of return on capital will
fall from 12 to 8.2 percent, a decline of 32 percent.
The firm depicted in Figure 1 had a moderately elastic demand curve; the
price elasticity~-percentagechange in quantity divided by percentage change
in price--was -1.5. If demand had been less elastic, the firm could have
shifted more of the tax forward to the consumer by way of higher prices. The
general result, however, remains the same: the imposition of ex situ
severance and royalty taxes have immediate effects of raising prices and
reducing both production and profitability. Production of firms remaining in
business declines--there is a reduction in the intensive margin--and production
from marginal firms ceases--there is a reduction in the extensive margin. The
first effect (of reduced production) aids conservation but the economic
annihilation of marginal firms runs counter to conservation. Investment in
renewal of the resource through exploration, discovery, and development will












The present value of a natural resource can be estimated by capitalizing its
future net income payments. A capitalized-value property tax at a percentage
rate r has the same impact on the value of the resource and the schedule of
production as an increase in the rate of discount of r percentage points
(Hotelling, 1931, p. 164). Hence such a tax encourages increased production
and shorter lives for resources. Some resource economists have thus suggested
that the property tax accelerates depletion because the taxpayer is able to
reduce the tax base by exhausting it (Vickrey, 1967, p. 323). The extent to
which this is true depends at least in part on the degree of monopoly: "lf,
on the other hand, mineral resources are controlled by firms with monopoly
power which retard current output in order to enhance prices, it is possible
that a substantial property tax on mineral deposits in place will cause the
monopolist to increase current output rates, with a consequent lowering of
prices" (Steele, 1967, p. 245).
Property taxes may also serve the useful purpose of inducing utilization
of properties being held idle for speculative purposes and may "bring down the
market price of leases to explore superior land, lessening the financial burden
of entry, opening the door to large numbers of small firms ... The immediate
impact of the property tax is on landowners, holdouts who have not yet signed
leases" (Gaffney, 1967, p. 406).
A practical administrative problem with capitalized-value property taxes
lies in assessment. Some assessors may base estimates of capitalized value on
initial production rates and, to the extent this is the case, production in
early years is curtailed. Also, some states base property tax assessments on
current production and when this happens the tax is more like a severance tax
which retards production.
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Although the federal government can levy property taxes, it has rarely
done so. Any federal property tax, according to the Sixteenth Amendment,
must be apportioned among the states by population and this has been done
only five times since 1789 (Gaffney, 1967, p. 402). A major appeal of the
property tax is its ready availability to state and local governments wishing
to accelerate their economic development.
7. Depletion Allowances
Percentage depletion allowances date back to 1926 when, in conjunction
with a rise in corporate income tax rates to 13 percent, oil and gas producers
were allowed to exempt 27-1/2 percent of their gross income from taxation.
In the Reich Case landmark decision, geothermal steam at The Geysers,
California was held to be a depletable gas and thus entitled to the same
percentage depletion allowance available to any other oil or gas producer
(1969 Tax Court of the United States).
The rate of percentage depletion was reduced in 1970, however, by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. As the law now stands, producers can deduct from taxable
income the smaller of (1) 22 percent of gross income or (2) 50 percent of net
income. Firms showing losses obtain no benefit from percentage depletion
allowances because of the 50 percent of net income restriction. The net
effective percentage depletion allowance for all firms averaged together has
been estimated as being approximately 17.6 percent (Peterson and Seo, 1975,
p. 12).
The real value of percentage depletion has risen over the years because
of increases in the corporate tax rates. With a current corporate income tax
rate of 48 percent, the percentage depletion provision makes each dollar of
revenue worth 8.4 cents (.48 x .176) more than it otherwise would have been.
..
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The economic effect of percentage depletion is the same as a negative excise
tax (i .e., a subsidy) of 8.4 percent.
The key economic argument in favor of depletion allowances rests, surpris-
ingly enough, not on the issue of depletion but rather on the issue of the
nonneutrality of the corporate income tax. It is now generallylalthough not
universally accepted by resource economists that the corporate profits tax
discriminates against risky and capital-intensive industries, such as oil and
gas as well as geothermal. As a result of such discrimination (nonneutrality),
relative profitability declines in such industries and investment funds flow
elsewhere. Percentage depletion allowances serve a re-neutralizing role and
help to restore the equity of the pre-tax situation: "on the basis of
available data and certain reasonable assumptions, the present tax provisions
applying to corporate income derived from oil and gas production seem to be
consistent with allocative neutrality as between that industry and manufactur-
ing, the latter taken to be the most logical standard of comparison"
(McDonald, 1961, p. 336).
Elsewhere the present author has discussed the economic implications of
depletion allowances (Peterson and Seo, 1975, pp. 18-26). Percentage depletion
provisions have the following effects:
• an increase in production both in the short- and long-run
• an increase in exploration, discovery, and development
• a lowering of prices
• a short-run increase in
the industry
• a long-run situation in
in other industries
profits which encourages new firms to enter
which average rates of return are no higher than
• a Life Index (ratio of reserves to output) which tends to remain constant.
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As a point of comparison, the above results are the opposite of the
effects of a severance tax. This is as it should be since a percentage
depletion allowance is an excise subsidy which is the opposite of an excise
tax. Withdrawal of percentage depletion privileges would, moreover, have the
same effects as the imposition of a severance tax.
Conclusions
General conclusions have been listed in the abstract. The preceding
discussion has been based on resource exploitation in general and applies to
such diverse assets as whooping cranes, herons, and coal mines. The emphasis,
however, has been on the oil and gas industry. By virtue of the Reich case,
geothermal steam production, at least at The Geysers, is legally a part of the
oil and gas industry. Specific policy recommendations for federal, state, and
local governments are as follows:
(1) It is desirable to institute a program of government subsidies or
guaranteed loans for weakly-financed firms. This has the effect of lowering
their rates of discount and will lengthen the lives of their resources.
(2) Severance taxes should be avoided since they result in both decreased
production and decreased exploration, as well as higher prices. Such taxes
represent a form of discrimination against resource development. In the
example presented of a capital-intensive firm, a 10 percent severance tax
reduced the rate of return on capital invested by 32 percent.
(3) Property taxes based on the capitalized-value of a resource are likely
to encourage utilization of properties being held for speculative reasons and
enable smaller-size firms to operate in the industry by bringing down the
market price of leases.
(4) Percentage depletion allowances are a desirable means of restoring
equity to risky and capital-intensive industries which are discriminated
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against by the corporate income tax. A percentage depletion allowance is an
excise subsidy and hence the opposite of an excise or severance tax, Any
withdrawal of depletion allowances would have the same deleterious effects as
an imposition of a severance tax.
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Steele (1967), pp. 252-3; see also Morris Beck, "Ability to Shift the
Corporate Income Tax: Seven Industri a1 Groups," National Tax Journal, 3
(September 1950); Di ran Bodenhorn, "The Shifting of the Corporation Income
Tax,1I Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70 (November 1956); Otto Eckstein,
"Comparison of United States and European Tax Structures and Growth
Implications ll in John Due (ed.), The Role of Direct and Indirect Taxes in
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Marian A. Krzyzaniak and Richard A. Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation
Income Tax (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963); Charles E. Marberry,
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Peter O. Steiner, liThe Non-Neutrality of Corporate Income Taxation - With
and Without Depletion," National Ta:c Journal, l6 (September 1963), pp. 238-251;
J. Fred Weston, "Incidence and Effects of the Corporate Income Tax,"
National Ta:c Journal, 2 (December 1949), pp. 313-314. According to Henry
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